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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
The tribulations of a taxpayer who has overpaid his federal income tax and, 
believing that the taxing authorities intend only to do exact justice in assessing 
and collecting the actual amount of tax due from him, sets out to recover the 
amount overpaid are vividly revealed in a case to which attention has been 
directed by a member of the accountancy profession.
Here is a brief statement of the taxpayer’s case:
John Doe filed his federal income-tax return for the year 1925 on or before 
March 15, 1926. He received no communication nor inquiry concerning it 
from any governmental sources whatever, the return apparently being ac­
cepted as correct.
On March 12, 1929, he filed a claim for refund of his 1925 income tax, based 
upon a correction of his failure to deduct $2,000 paid by him as a commission 
on a sale of real estate made in 1925.
On or about June 1, 1929, a revenue agent called upon John Doe to audit 
his 1925 claim for refund. The revenue agent stated that he would make a 
regular, detailed audit of all items of the 1925 tax return and proceeded to do 
so. In the course of his audit he allowed the commission as a proper deduc­
tion that should have been made originally, but “found” that the taxpayer 
had deducted excessive depreciation on certain properties. The excessive 
depreciation found by the revenue agent amounted to $2,000. The revenue 
agent thereupon advised the taxpayer that while it was true that the $2,000 
deduction for commission was an allowable deduction, the excessive depre­
ciation would be an equal offset against the refund and, therefore, no refund 
would be made.
The only remarkable thing about this case is that, as happens so frequently, 
upon audit of a claim for refund the examining officer finds some additional tax 
due which equals, if it does not exceed, the amount claimed by the taxpayer.
However, let us consider the law in this specific case:
Under the acts of 1924 and 1926, the taxpayer has until March 15, 1930, to 
make a claim for refund of overpayment of income tax returned for the year 
1925. The commissioner has until March 15, 1930, to assess a deficiency of tax 
if found by him in a 1925 tax return. In view of the fact that the settlement of 
the question of overpayment and deficiency of tax can be made as late as 
March 15, 1930, it is presumed that in due course John Doe will receive from the 
commissioner an answer to his claim for refund.
He will also receive from the commissioner prior to March 15, 1930, an asser­
tion of a deficiency because of the excessive depreciation. Then he will have 
just sixty days within which to appeal to the United States board of tax ap­
peals against the assessment of the deficiency. If he thus appeals he will then 
wait a year or two before the board gets to his case. In the meantime, the com­
missioner will withhold payment of the refund until the whole matter has been 
adjudicated by the board.
All of which is according to the law, however whimsical it may seem and 
however ponderous is the machinery by which the law is administered.
135
The Journal of Accountancy
One can readily realize how exasperating this is to the taxpayer, but nothing 
can be done about it. We sometimes ponder upon the ingenuity of the minds 
that evolved so intricate a device for the imposing and collecting of federal taxes. 
Of course the machinery creaks just as loudly when it is producing a decision on 
a one-hundred-dollar item as it does in producing a million-dollar decision. 
It roars, puffs, crunches as the examination of the taxpayer’s claim proceeds 
from the board to the court of claims or the circuit court of appeals, and some­
times to the supreme court of the United States. One looks upon the dauntless 
and solemn operators of the machine with awe, augmented by the intricate 
character of the proceedings, opinions and rulings, and the heavy solemnity of 
the operators. It seems to the lay mind little less than sacrilegious to feed the 
machinery a claim for less than a million dollars.
In the instant case it is interesting to speculate as to what would have hap­
pened if John Doe had in his original return deducted the commission paid.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Collection of 1918 taxes assessed in 1919 for which a bond was given in 1919 
pursuant to section 234 (a) (14) (a), act of 1918, in connection with claims for 
abatement thereof, binding the taxpayer as principal and the surety to pay 
“ any part of such tax found by the commissioner to be due ” is held not barred 
under sec. 250 (d), act of 1918, and similar limitations provisions of subsequent 
acts, the making of the bond giving the United States a cause of action separate 
and distinct from an action to collect taxes, and such sections can not be ex­
tended by implication to a suit upon a subsequent and substituted contract. 
(Supreme court of the United States. The United States v. The John Barth 
Company and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.)
Such portion of a “return bag liability” account, representing the difference 
between the cost of bags in which the taxpayer’s product was shipped and the 
amount charged purchasers of the product for such bags, under a provision by 
which the taxpayer retained the property in the bags and agreed, upon their 
return, to refund the amount charged therefor, should be included in income for 
1919, as experience had established represented the income from bags that would 
not be returned. (Court of claims of the United States. Alpha Portland Ce­
ment Co. v. The United States.)
A corporation may not deduct donations to the American Red Cross and simi­
lar organizations.
The disallowance for 1918 by the commissioner of credit for income and ex­
cess-profits taxes paid in 1918 to the British government which were expenses 
of the taxpayer’s London office, the books of which were kept on the cash- 
receipts-and-disbursements basis, and his determination that the taxpayer’s 
books were on the accrual basis were not shown to be erroneous, there being no 
evidence that the greater proportion of the taxpayer’s accounts were not kept 
on the accrual basis.
Earned surplus may not include the difference between the cash purchase 
price of stock and the par value of such stock, where the value of the stock when 
acquired was not in excess of the purchase price. (Court of claims of the 
United States. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. The United States.)
Taxable gain on non-assignable life-insurance policies taken out in 1899 pay­
able to the estate of the insured, fully paid up in 1908, realized in 1919 upon the 
exercise, at the end of a tontine period of twenty years, of an option to receive 
the face of the policies plus “ the cash dividend then apportioned by the com­
pany,” was held to be that portion of the total gain attributable to the policies 
which accrued after March 1, 1913, to be ascertained as the excess of the amount 
received over the sum of the insurance-reserve liability and the dividend ac­
cumulations provisionally apportioned to the policies on March 1, 1913. The 
judgment of the court of appeals in 27 Fed. (2d) 237, noted at 98.34, vol. I, 
which fixed the March 1, 1913, value of the policies by discounting, as of that 
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date, at 4 percent, the total estimated value of the policies at their maturity, 
was affirmed, for, while it did not ascertain the March 1, 1913, value or the 
taxable gain with accuracy, the accuracy of such computation was not ques­
tioned and it gave a result of which the taxpayer can not complain.
In applying sec. 202 (a) (1), act of 1918, to an insurance policy having no 
market value, in determining the taxable gain realized upon the exercise at the 
end of a tontine period, of the option to receive the face of the policies plus the 
cash dividend then apportioned by the company, March 1, 1913, value is at 
most merely a method of allocating a known income to the periods in which it 
actually accrued, its fair value on such date being that part actually realized by 
the taxpayer which, by the use of appropriate accounting methods, can fairly 
be said to have accrued before March 1, 1913. (Supreme court of the United 
States. Robert H. Lucas, collector of internal revenue for the District of Ken­
tucky, v. Kate Halloway Alexander, et al., etc.)
Held that the conclusion that no part of the cost of units of one share of pre­
ferred and two shares of common stock should be allocated to the common 
stock which held the voting rights is not warranted on the ground that the 
value of the common stock “was highly speculative and entirely prospective,” 
since there is generally an existing value even in speculative and prospective 
values, and in view of the fact that the common stock had the voting rights. 
B. T. A. Dec. 2756 reversed and remanded to determine a fair apportionment of 
cost as between the two classes of stock. If no apportionment can be made, 
the taxpayer is not chargeable with gain upon the sale of such stock until he 
shall have recovered the entire purchase price. (United States circuit court of 
appeals, sixth circuit. Harry E. Collin v. Commissioner.)
The jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals is limited to a review of the 
decisions of the board of tax appeals upon matters of law and does not extend to 
an inquiry in disputed questions of fact. (United States circuit court of ap­
peals for fifth circuit. E. G. Robichaux Company, Ltd., v. Commissioner.)
The decedent’s gross estate should not include the present value of 90 per 
cent. of the principal of eight so-called charitable trusts except as to the one 
first terminated by the death of the beneficiary thereof, which pass to ten 
charitable and religious corporations under the residuary clause of a will, where 
the will provided that the trust funds of such eight charitable trusts were to be­
come part of the residuary estate upon the death of the beneficiaries thereof, 
and a codicil thereto modified the legacies to the religious and charitable institu­
tions by providing that the proceeds of lapsed legacies and devises or illegal 
devises should not increase the residuary estate and excluding such institutions 
from sharing in any part of the estate except any remainder as shall exist or ap­
pear if all the devises and legacies in the will and codicil were duly capitalized 
and created, the estate was insufficient to pay all legacies and trusts in full, and 
the state court, in construing the will, directed payments of 91 per cent. of the 
legacies and trusts, and provided for a pro rata distribution of the eight chari­
table trusts among the survivors, charitable and otherwise, since to use the 
eight charitable trusts, except the one first terminated to supply the deficiency 
either in the other seven or any of the other trusts and legacies, would violate 
the state rule of perpetuities. Since none of the eight charitable trusts had 
been terminated by death, the court held, on the basis of mortality tables, that 
the first trust to be terminated would be that of the oldest beneficiaries, the 
present value of which should be included in the gross estate. (United States 
district court, northern district of New York. Francis E. Hidden & Empire 
Trust Company as executors of the last will and testament of Thomas E. Hidden, 
deceased, v. Cyrus Durey, collector of internal revenue of the 14th district of New 
York.)
The collection of 1917 tax after the expiration of the statutory period is un­
lawful, there being no authority for the waivers executed after the statute had 
run, the waivers being without consideration. (District court of the United 
States, western district of Pennsylvania. Spear & Co. v. D. B. Heiner, 
collector.)
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